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In the free will debate, libertarians have put a great deal of emphasis on our 
conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. In fact, many liber-
tarians have suggested that our introspection of the decision-making process, 
along with our strong feeling of freedom, provides some kind of evidence for 
the existence of free will. As Ledger Wood describes the libertarian argument:
Most advocates of the free will doctrine believe that the mind is directly 
aware of its freedom in the very act of making a decision, and thus that 
freedom is an immediate datum of our introspective awareness. “I feel 
myself free, therefore, I am free,” runs the simplest and perhaps the most 
compelling of the arguments for freedom (1941: 387).
We can call this argument the introspective argument for free will. 
The introspective argument essentially maintains that, upon introspec-
tion, we do not seem to be causally determined—instead, we feel that 
our actions and decisions are freely decided by us—hence, we must 
be free. Libertarians, especially agent-causal theorists, take this in-
trospective datum as their main evidence in support of free will.1
This kind of argument only works, however, if we assume the data is 
veridical. But, as we’ll see, there is reason to doubt the reliability of such 
introspective evidence. How do we know that our feeling of freedom isn’t an 
illusion? How do we know that what we introspect is accurate? Libertarians 
seldom question the “I feel myself free, therefore, I am free” argument. In fact, 
the introspective argument can be found throughout the literature. Given this, it 
is important that we investigate both the role of consciousness and the accuracy 
of introspection. Perhaps a closer examination of these issues will reveal that 
the nature of consciousness, rather than supporting free will further impugns it.
I. Consciousness and Free Will
Although libertarians put a great deal of emphasis on conscious-
ness when it comes to introspecting our own freedom, they ironi-
cally overlook the importance of consciousness when it comes to 
explaining its role in producing free actions. Timothy O’Connor, 
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for example, seems to be aware of this shortcoming when he writes:
Something the philosopher ought to be able to provide some general light 
on is how consciousness figures into the equation. It is a remarkable feature 
of most accounts of free will that they give no essential role to conscious 
awareness. One has the impression that an intelligent automata could 
conceivably satisfy the conditions set by these accounts—something that 
is very counterintuitive (2000: 122).
I share O’Connor’s surprise at the fact that consciousness has not played a 
larger role in accounts of free will, especially given the obvious importance 
of conscious awareness. It truly is counterintuitive to think that one could 
exercise free will while at the same time being wholly unaware that they are 
doing so. An intelligent automaton cannot and should not be the paradigm of a 
free agent. One could even argue that it is logically inconceivable to imagine an 
automaton—a creature that lacks all conscious awareness—that has freedom.2 
If libertarian accounts of freedom wish to be successful, then, they need to 
show that one of the functions of consciousness is that it somehow exercises 
free will.3 Given the requirement of conscious awareness, it is a sad state of 
affairs when libertarians like O’Connor dedicate no more than a few lines to the 
issue. O’Connor himself only presents one, very vague proposal. He claims:
The agency theorist can conjecture that a function of biological conscious-
ness, in its specifically human (and probably certain other mammalian) 
manifestations, is to subserve the very agent-causal capacity I sketched 
in previous chapters (2000: 122). 
Beyond this, O’Connor doesn’t explain how or in what way con-
sciousness subserves agent-causal powers. And after an exhaustive 
examination of the literature, I have been unable to find any substan-
tial account of the role consciousness plays in libertarian freedom. 
 I can only conclude, then, that libertarianism lacks a complete story. 
On the one hand they appeal to our conscious feeling of freedom as evidence 
of free will, while on the other hand they neglect to explain the role and 
importance of consciousness. O’Connor’s comments simply amount to the 
following two claims: (1) That the “self-determining capacity [required for lib-
ertarian freedom] strictly requires conscious awareness” (2000: 122); and (2) 
that somehow consciousness aids in this capacity. I point this out only to expose 
one (often overlooked) problem with libertarianism—they have provided us 
with nothing but a promissory note when it comes to the crucial question of 
explaining the role of consciousness in the exercise of agent-causal powers. 
Returning, however, to the introspective argument, from the fact that 
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I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. The feeling 
could be an illusion. It is a fallacy to think that one could establish a meta-
physical conclusion from phenomenology alone. More than an appeal to our 
introspective experience would be needed to prove that we actually enjoy 
agent-causation. That said, what this argument does show is that people often 
infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. 
Why is this so? Well one possible answer is that people implicitly believe that 
we have access to all the causal factors and the causal processes underlying 
our own decision-making. If people were to believe in such introspective 
transparency, then it would be appropriate, given the above phenomenol-
ogy, for them to infer that they are undetermined. For if one introspects no 
deterministic processes underlying one’s decision making, and one also 
thinks that if there were a deterministic process one would introspect it, one 
could infer that there is no deterministic process. This is, I believe, part of 
the story of why we feel free.4 It is important then to examine whether we 
really are transparently and infallibly aware of all our mental activity, for 
it is our belief in the transparency and infallibility of consciousness that 
gives the introspective argument whatever power it possesses.    
Given that the majority of support for free will comes from our introspec-
tive awareness of the decision-making process, and consciousness appears 
to be a necessary condition for free will, it would seem that an account of 
the mind which claims that all mental states are conscious states would be 
more accommodating to defenders of free will. Such an account of the mind 
can be traced back to the father of modern libertarianism, René Descartes. 
One can find at the heart of Descartes’ philosophy of mind three main theses:
T(1) hat the mind and body are two mutually exclusive, 
interacting, non-identical substances—the mind being a 
completely nonphysical substance. 
That there is nothing in our mind of which we are not (2) 
conscious; i.e., all mental states are conscious states.
Our knowledge of our own mental states is certain and (3) 
infallible; our judgments about them cannot be erroneous.
The first of these theses, of course, has been widely criticized. Despite a 
retreat from the metaphysics of substance dualism, however, the rest of 
the Cartesian concept of mind remains largely intact when it comes to 
theorizing about consciousness and free will. Theses (2) and (3) combined 
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amount to the claim that all mental states are conscious and that such con-
sciousness is infallible. Essentially this is the belief in the transparency 
and infallibility of consciousness.5 From a first person point of view these 
two theses seem to make sense. We are conscious of our mental states in a 
way that seems, at least subjectively, to be direct, immediate, and infallible. 
What we need to investigate here then is whether our phenomenol-
ogy, which seems to support these two theses, is accurate or not. I will 
argue that it is not. From a first-person point of view, it may seem as 
though we are aware of all our mental states—including mental reason-
ing and decision making—in an immediate, direct, and infallible way, 
but from a third-person point of view we can often see that this is not the 
case. I believe that it is partly because consciousness appears transparent 
from the first-person point of view that we impart so much power to the 
conscious will. If it turns out, however, that consciousness is not trans-
parent then the introspective argument for free will would lose its force.
II. Mentality and Consciousness
Let us begin with the claim that all mental states are conscious states. This 
conception of mentality and consciousness not only claims that conscious-
ness is an essential property of mental states, but also that consciousness is 
the mark of the mental. For on the Cartesian concept of mind, what makes a 
state a mental state is its being a conscious state. States that are not conscious 
are also not mental. This, however, has significant theoretical drawbacks. 
Some, like David Rosenthal (2005), have argued that if consciousness is 
what makes a state a mental state, consciousness will not only be an intrin-
sic, nonrelational property of all mental states, it will also be impossible 
to analyze. Since the Cartesian concept of mind tacitly conflates mentality 
and consciousness—thereby making consciousness essential to all mental 
states—no reductive explanation of consciousness can be given in terms of 
other higher-level cognitive or mental processes (see Rosenthal, 1986, 2002). 
 If this is true, then any theory of consciousness that equates mind 
and consciousness faces a serious explanatory problem. But what is equally 
troubling (or perhaps even more troubling) is what accepting this equiva-
lence means for understanding the mind itself, not only consciousness. If we 
were to equate mind and consciousness, we would then have to understand 
mental processes in terms of consciousness. “So accepting the equivalence 
would also prevent us from ever developing an informative account of mind” 
(Rosenthal, 2002: 237). We would be unable to investigate mental processes 
without at the same time investigating conscious processes. This, I believe, 
is not only theoretically unacceptable it is also empirically unjustifiable! 
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There is more than ample reason to believe that not all mental states are 
conscious states. Many types of mental states—such as thoughts, desires, 
beliefs, judgments, and intentions—often occur without being conscious. 
Both common sense and cognitive science typically posits mental states 
that are not conscious to explain certain behaviors and cognitive capacities. 
The most widely accepted of these unconscious mental states are intentional 
states. There are not only clinical and experimental results which provide 
good reason to hold that beliefs and desires exist that are not conscious, 
but everyday folk psychology makes much use of intentional states that 
are not conscious to explain the actions of others.6 One could even argue 
that the majority of our intentional states are probably nonconscious.7 
The work of Timothy Wilson, John Bargh, Ap Dijksterhuis, Benjamin 
Libet, and others,8 has shown that “the same higher mental processes that 
have traditionally served as quintessential examples of choice and free 
will—such as goal pursuits, judgment, and interpersonal behavior—have 
been shown recently to occur in the absence of conscious choice or guid-
ance” (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000: 926). It is no longer believed that only 
lower-level processing can occur outside the reach of consciousness. There is 
now growing evidence that a great deal of higher-level mental functioning is 
also nonconscious. Psychologists and cognitive scientists have accumulated 
a great deal of evidence for determinism by demonstrating that high-level 
mental and behavioral processes “can proceed without the intervention of 
conscious deliberation and choice” (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000: 925). All 
of this mounting research, I believe, indicates that high level unconscious 
cognitive states—states that are best described as mental—actively, and 
frequently, play a role in human behavior.9 The Cartesian thesis, then, 
that all mental states are conscious states—though perhaps supported by 
phenomenology—has multiple strikes against it and is probably false.10 
III. Knowing Thy Self: Consciousness and Self-Reports
In addition to the assumption that all mental states are conscious, liber-
tarian and folk psychological accounts of consciousness usually make the 
related assumption that consciousness provides us with infallible knowledge 
of our (conscious) mental states. The claim of infallibility is another part 
of the traditional Cartesian concept of mind.11 From a first-person point 
of view, this assumption seems to makes sense. Who else, we feel, is in 
a better position to know which mental states we are in than ourselves? 
It is often assumed, almost at a definitional level, that we are immedi-
ately, directly, and infallibly connected to the content of our own minds. 
From a first-person point of view, it never seems as though consciousness 
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and mentality come apart. Subjectively, it never seems to us that conscious-
ness mischaracterizes or misidentifies the mental states we are in. It is hard 
for us to believe that our consciousness can mislead us about the nature of 
our own minds or that we can be in mental states that we are unaware of. 
Although this is undoubtedly how things seem from a first-person 
point of view, I do not think we can rely on phenomenology alone at the 
exclusion of all other information. There is a great deal of evidence sug-
gesting that we are not always the best judges of what’s going on in our 
own minds.12 Researchers, for example, are increasingly realizing that the 
mental states and processes that they are interested in measuring are not 
always consciously accessible to their participants, forcing them to rely on 
alternative methods.13 The introspective method—i.e., the method of rely-
ing on the introspective reports of subjects—has, in fact, come under attack 
numerous times throughout the history of psychology (See, e.g., Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977; Lieberman, 1979; Jack & Roepstorff, 2002). In attitudes 
research, for example, a number of researchers now argue that people could 
simultaneously possess different implicit and explicit attitudes towards 
the same object—with self-reports measuring only the explicit attitude 
(e.g., Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 2000). This has led some to develop 
implicit measures to explore the nature of these attitudes and people’s 
awareness of them (see, e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).14 
 Our ability to know our own mental states is limited and fallible. 
People have access to many of their mental states, no doubt, but there is also 
a pervasive adaptive unconscious that is often inaccessible via introspec-
tion (Wilson, 2002, 2003). In addition, consciousness, which is accessible 
to introspective reports, does not always represent our mental states and 
processes accurately. There is good reason to believe that individuals often 
confabulate stories for why they do certain things. When this happens, one’s 
first-person reports fail to match the actual causes for their action. This has 
been shown to happen, for example, in hypnotized subjects. After being 
hypnotized, subjects can enact a posthypnotic suggestion—e.g., “when 
you awake you will immediately crawl around on your hands and knees.” 
When asked what they are doing, subjects almost immediately generate a 
rationale—“I think I lost an earring down here” (Gazzaniga, 1985; Hilgard, 
1965; Estabrooks, 1943). From a first-person point of view, these individuals 
are conscious of a particular reason for why they are doing what they are 
doing, but from a third-person point of view we can see that this is not the 
real cause of their action. Similar examples of confabulation have also been 
found in “split brain” patients (Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978) and patients 
with Korsakoff’s syndrome—a form of organic amnesia where people 
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lose their ability to form memories of new experiences (Sacks, 1987).15
 Although it may be tempting to think such confabulation is limited 
to these rare occasions, some theorists have suggested that similar confabu-
lation occurs throughout everyday life (see, e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; 
Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978; Wilson, 2002). These theorists argue that our 
conscious selves often do not fully know why we do what we do and thus 
have to confabulate stories and create explanations. In one of the most 
famous papers on the subject, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) placed subjects 
in identical situations save for the fact that one or two key features were 
varied. They observed that although these key features influenced people’s 
judgments or behavior, when asked to explain why they responded the way 
they did, subjects remained unaware of the varied features and instead con-
fabulated different explanations for their behavior. Studies like this seriously 
question the accuracy of consciousness awareness, because they reveal that 
consciousness does not provide us with transparent and infallible knowl-
edge of our own minds. We may consciously think we are doing something 
because of reason X, when in reality we are doing it because of reason Y. 16 
IV. Conclusion
 What does this mean for the introspective argument for free will? 
I believe it shows that we cannot rely on our conscious experience alone 
to determine what the true causes of our actions are. We are often unaware 
of important causal determinates. The fact that we do not feel causally de-
termined, or that we are not consciously aware of the various (internal and 
external) influences on our behavior, does not mean such determinates do 
not exist. Worse still, if consciousness can confabulate and/or misrepresent 
the causes for our choices and/or actions, then to rely on such conscious 
data to infer our own freedom would be a mistake. Whatever persuasive-
ness the introspective argument originally had depended on the assumption 
that we had direct, infallible access to our own decision-making process. 
The argument assumes that consciousness reveals everything about our 
mental functioning, or at least everything relevant to the issue at hand. 
If what I’ve argued here is correct, this is not the case. What we are con-
scious of—and hence, what we can report on—is not always in line with 
what is otherwise going on mentally. If it turns out, as recent research 
suggests, that a great deal of mental activity is controlled by unconscious 
mental states, and that we can also misrepresent and confabulate the states 
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Notes
1  Agent-causal theorists traditionally take our feeling of freedom and self-
exertion as evidence that we are agent-causes. Timothy O’Connor, for example, 
writes: “[T]he agency theory is appealing because it captures the way we experience 
our own activity. It does not seem to me (at least ordinarily) that I am caused to act 
by the reasons which favor doing so; it seems to be the case, rather, that I produce 
my decision in view of those reasons, and could have, in an unconditional sense, 
decided differently…Just as the non-Humean is apt to maintain that we not only 
perceive, e.g., the movement of the axe along with the separation of the wood, but 
the axe splitting the wood…, so I have the apparent perception of my actively and 
freely deciding to take Seneca Street to my destination and not Buffalo instead” 
(1995: 167-68). Richard Taylor, another leading agent-causal theorist, maintains 
that there are two introspective items of data: (1) That I feel that my behavior is 
sometimes the outcome of my deliberations, and (2) that in these and other cases, I 
feel that it is sometimes up to me what I do (1992, ch.5). He then concludes: “The 
only conception of action that accords with our data is one according to which 
people—and perhaps some other things too—are sometimes, but of course not 
always, self-determining beings; that is, beings that are sometimes the cause of 
their own behavior” (1992: 51).
2  As J. Bargh and M. Ferguson point out, “Willfulness is assumed to reside in 
consciousness, and, therefore, a lack of conscious involvement in a process implies 
it was not [freely] willed” (2000: 925-26). See also Bargh 1989, 1996. 
3  To O’Connor’s credit, he recognizes this point. He states: “It is highly plau-
sible that this self-determining capacity strictly requires conscious awareness. This 
appears to follow from the very way in which active power has been characterized 
as structured by motivating reasons and as allowing the free formation of execu-
tive states of intention in accordance with one of the possible courses of action 
represented to oneself. (I am tempted to think that one should be able to explicitly 
demonstrate the absurdity of supposing an agent-causal capacity as being exercised 
entirely unconsciously)” (2000: 122).  
4  I believe this is part of the story, yet not the whole story, of why we feel free. 
I do not think it is the whole story because it does not explain why, upon introspec-
tion, we also feel the positive power of active freedom and self-determination. Not 
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being aware of deterministic causes may explain why we believe no such causes 
exist, but it does not fully explain the phenomenology of agent-causation. To fully 
explain why we feel free, I believe we will also have to examine the phenomenology 
surrounding our feeling of “self-causation” and our feeling of “intentional control” 
over our actions. The apparent transparency and infallibility of consciousness, I 
maintain, is one of four main phenomenological features of consciousness that cre-
ate the illusion of free will. For a full account of how the cognitive illusion of free 
will is created, see my Free Will and Conscious Illusion: A Determinist Account 
of the Cognitive Illusion of Free Will (in progress).  
5  I have elsewhere called this the “Cartesian assumption” and have presented 
arguments against it. See Caruso, 2005. 
6  In fact, the majority of philosophers, pace John Searle (1990, 1992), now 
agree that there are nonconscious intentional states.
7  As Timothy Wilson puts it, the view “that consciousness is the tip of the 
mental iceberg…[was] short of the mark by quite a bit—it may be more the size 
of a snowball on top of that iceberg” (2002: 6). 
8  See, Wilson, 2002; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; 
Bargh, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1997; Bargh, Barndollar, Gollwitzer, & Trotschel, 2001; 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bechara, H. Damsio, Tranel, & A. Damasio, 1997; Di-
jksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Knippenberg, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, & 
Scheepers, 1998; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000, 2003; Dijksterhuis & Knippenberg, 
1998; Steele & Aronson, 1995, and Libet, 1985, 1987, 1993. 
9  I should point out that when talking about nonconscious mental states, I do 
not mean simply to be talking about dispositional states: states that are disposed 
to be occurrent conscious states. I mean to be making the stronger claim that these 
are occurrent nonconscious states—states that influence behavior and interact with 
other mental states, both conscious and nonconscious. 
10  Timothy Wilson has even compared it to “Descartes’ error” of Cartesian 
dualism. He writes: “Descartes made a related error that is less well known but 
no less egregious. Not only did he endow the mind with a special status that was 
unrelated to physical laws; he also restricted the mind to consciousness. The mind 
consists of all that people consciously think, he argued, and nothing else. This equa-
tion of thinking and consciousness eliminates, with one swift stroke, any possibility 
of nonconscious thought—a move that was called the ‘Cartesian catastrophe’ by 
Arthur Koestler and ‘one of the fundamental blunders made by the human mind’ 
by Lancelot Whyte. Koestler rightly notes that this idea led to ‘an impoverishment 
of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy’” (2002: 9-10).
11  Although Descartes famously entertained the possibility that the content of 
my mental states may not match reality, he never entertained the possibility that my 
own mental states may diverge from my conscious awareness of them. Descartes 
claims in numerous places that one cannot be mistaken about how things seem to 
them to be in consciousness (see, e.g., CSM II, 19; AT VII, 29). For Descartes, our 
judgments about our mental states are certain and infallible. 
12  As Rosenthal points out: “[C]onsciousness does not always represent our 
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mental states accurately. Consciousness seems infallible because it never shows 
itself to be mistaken and it’s tempting to think that there’s no other way to know 
what mental states one is in. But consciousness is not the only way to determine 
what mental state one is in, and there is sometimes compelling independent evidence 
that goes against what consciousness tell us” (Rosenthal, 2004: 27).
13  For a good review, see Wilson 2003.
14  See Wilson (2003) for more on the limits of introspective reports. With 
regard to emotions research, for example, Wilson writes: “With the advent of im-
plicit measures and new theories about brain functioning, many researchers now 
argue that some feelings are inaccessible to conscious awareness, not necessarily 
because of repression, but because of the architecture of the mind” (Wilson, 2003: 
134; see also, LeDoux, 1996; Wilson, 2002).
15  For a good review of confabulation, which includes examples from split-brain 
patients, people suffering from organic amnesia, and people acting out posthypnotic 
suggestion, see Wilson, 2002: ch.5. 
16  In their original paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argued that people often 
make inaccurate reports about the causes of their responses because there is little 
or no introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. They theorized that 
when people try to give introspective reports on the causes of their behavior, what 
they are really doing is making reasonable inferences about what the causes must 
have been, not giving direct introspective reports of the actual causes. A number of 
critics accurately pointed out that this thesis was far too extreme (Smith & Miller, 
1978; Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Gavanski & Hoffman, 1987), and Wilson has since 
modified his views (see, Wilson & Stone, 1985; Wilson, 2002). My position is that 
we often do have direct access to our own mental states (i.e., our higher cognitive 
processes), but that the way we are aware of such states allows for the possibility 
of misrepresentation and confabulation. I further maintain that we need to distin-
guish between ordinary consciousness and introspective consciousness. I believe 
that error can occur at both levels and that people often conflate the two types of 
mistakes
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